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1 Introduction
The World Trade Organization (WTO) declaration
launching the current multilateral trade negotiations,
styled by some as the Doha Development Round, put
developing country interests and the concept of
special and differential treatment (SDT) at its core.
Paragraph 2 of the Declaration pointed out that the
majority of WTO members are developing countries
and that ‘their needs and interests [are] at the heart of
the Work Programme adopted in this Declaration’
(WTO 2001). Paragraph 44 reaffirms that:
provisions for special and differential treatment
are an integral part of the WTO Agreements. ...
We therefore agree that all special and
differential treatment provisions shall be
reviewed with a view to strengthening them
and making them more precise, effective and
operational (WTO 2001: para. 44).
Yet the discussions on SDT are at an impasse. As
Claire Melamed explains (this volume), there has
been virtually no progress in the WTO Committee
on Trade and Development (CTD) which has been
charged with this review. It is only a modest
exaggeration to say that WTO members are still at
first base. The industrialised countries are willing
to offer only token gestures, such as a monitoring
mechanism for existing SDT. Developing countries
are demanding the unattainable: binding
commitments on the industrialised countries to
provide substantial positive support and to remove
all barriers to developing country exports, coupled
with full exemption for themselves from any
commitment to do anything.
To an extent, this absence of progress simply mirrors
what is happening in the other working groups. At
the time of writing, movement on all the main items
of the Doha agenda has been glacial, at best. The
Doha timetable foresees agreement being reached by
2005, but no recent Round has ended on time.
The Tokyo Round was launched in 1973 with the
stated expectation of completion in 27 months; it
took over 6 years. The Uruguay Round was
launched with the confident prediction that it
would be concluded within 4 years; it was finalised
at Marrakesh in 1994, having taken ‘over four years
to prepare, and seven more years to complete’
(Croome 1995: 1). On these precedents, the Doha
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Round will be with us for the rest of the decade,
making slow and erratic progress.
But the problems on SDT are more than “business
as usual”. The acronym is simply a handle for efforts
to recast the multilateral trade regulatory system to
cope with crucially important changes between the
WTO and its predecessor, the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and with the much
higher level of developing country involvement.
1.1 The centrality of special and
differential treatment
This volume of the IDS Bulletin is a contribution to
the process. It provides concrete examples of the
ways in which WTO rules need to be framed from
the outset with the circumstances of developing
countries very much in mind. Development needs
should not be dealt with as an ex post “bolt on” after
the principal architectural features of the regime
have been established.
If this is to be achieved, the SDT framework in the
WTO must evolve substantially. There is a place for
very specific provisions within the separate
agreements that make up the WTO texts (as well as
in the country schedules that implement whatever
is agreed), but there is also a role for broader, WTO-
wide statements of principal and mechanisms. The
two are linked, of course: the principles must
provide a framework for agreement-specific
differentiation and must, in turn, be informed by
the specific needs of different groups of developing
countries as identified by the detailed negotiations.
The Bulletin provides guidance at both levels.
One clear reason why there is a need for general
principles is that the WTO negotiating process is
not one that is designed to throw up automatically
development friendly results, and nor does it do so
in practice. Negotiations in the GATT were
typically hard-nosed, with negotiators following
very narrow, mercantilist agendas. The evidence
from the WTO is that this has not changed. What
has changed are the complexity of the issues being
negotiated and the impact of what is agreed.
The innovation of the WTO to make dispute
settlement binding increased the stakes
enormously: agreements reached in haste have
come back to haunt their signatories. The move
away from relatively simple border measures like
tariffs and quotas towards behind-the-border
policies, where the reverberations of multilateral
rules may be far from clear, has made it very
difficult even for middle-income developing
countries to be confident that they understand fully
and accept what their trade partners request.
1.2 The shadow of trade-related
intellectual property rights
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) is the spectre at
the feast. Hailed by many at the time of Marrakesh
as both modest and desirable, the agreement has
long been criticised by trade economists such as
Jagdish Bhagwati, whose multilateral credentials are
impeccable, as ‘turning the WTO, thanks to
powerful lobbies, into a royalty-collection agency’
(letter to the Financial Times, 20 February 2001). By
2000, the United Kingdom’s (UK) Performance and
Innovation Unit (PIU), in a report on trade policy
with a foreword by Tony Blair, admitted that:
it is at least arguable that the TRIPs agreement
is tilted in favour of the producers of patented
products (most of which are in the developed
world) to the disadvantage of developing
countries in need of access to medicines and
technology for health purposes (PIU 2000:
para. 8.28).
The international Commission on Intellectual
Property Rights (CIPR), established by Clare Short
with a secretariat staffed mainly by officials drawn
from the UK Department for International
Development (DFID), has gone much further. Its
final report argues that:
the interests of developing countries are best
served by tailoring their intellectual property
regimes to their particular economic and social
circumstances. ... A crucial question, however,
is how this objective can be accommodated
within the complex international architecture
of multilateral, regional and bilateral
[intellectual property] rules and standards
which impose unprecedented limits on the
freedom of countries to act as they see fit in this
field (CIPR 2002: 155).
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The TRIPs agreement has much wider relevance
than just intellectual property (IP). Its negotiation,
terms (especially regarding transition periods),
implementation, and subsequent review provide a
stark example of the development dangers posed
by international trade negotiations (including, but
not exclusively, in the WTO), which in turn
represents the challenge that SDT must meet.
The important lesson concerning the negotiation of
TRIPs is that it exists: it was accepted by developing
countries, and not all this acceptance was of the
tacit variety. Major players like India and Brazil
engaged actively. Their reasons for accepting the
final outcome were complex, partly reflecting
expectations about gains from other parts of the
Uruguay Round and partly domestic considerations
on intellectual property rights (IPRs). Whatever the
reason, the existence of a large developing country
contingent including some heavyweights failed to
prevent rules being introduced, the development
implications of which are now being questioned.
The lesson about transition periods and other
implementation modalities is that traditional
approaches to SDT are woefully inadequate as a
means for alleviating development costs. In the
GATT/WTO tradition, TRIPs provides extended
implementation periods for developing and least
developed countries. These provided, with effect
from 1 January 1995, a delay in implementation of 1
year for all countries, 5 years for developing countries
(extendable to 10 years for technology sectors where
no previous IP protection was accorded), and 11
years for least developed countries (extendable on
request to the WTO Council). These periods were
plucked out of thin air and, in many cases, are wholly
inappropriate. The CIPR conclude that:
we are not persuaded by the arguments that
developing countries at very different stages of
development should be required to adopt a
specific date ... when they will provide the TRIPS
standards of protection within their domestic IP
regimes, regardless of their progress in creating a
viable technological base (CIPR 2002: 161).
Another aspect of SDT was that various flexibilities
were granted to developing countries and least
developed countries in their IP legislation, not least
in respect of public health and plant protection.
But such flexibility is of little value if it is not
incorporated into legislation, and such
incorporation is feasible only in countries with the
appropriate technical knowledge. In reviewing the
IP legislation in some 70 developing and least
developed countries, the CIPR found that:
only around a quarter of these countries
specifically excluded plants and animals from
patent protection, less than half provided for
international exhaustion of patent rights and
less than a fifth specifically provided a so-
called “Bolar” exception to patent rights (CIPR
2002: 160).
This is despite the fact that TRIPs allows for all of
these. Among the possible reasons suggested is that
domestic legislators were unaware of the flexibility
options, while the bodies like theWorld Intellectual
Property Organisation (WIPO) providing technical
assistance to the legislative process chose not to
suggest them.
At the same time, the industrialised countries have
been active in using dispute settlement to enforce
TRIPs. Some 24 cases involving TRIPs have been
brought to dispute settlement, seven of them by
developed against developing countries and only
one by a developing against a developed country
(CIPR 2002: 3).
The final lesson of TRIPs is that once WTO
agreements have been signed, whatever
imperfections are subsequently discovered, they
are virtually impossible to revise. It is for this
reason that the CIPR recognises that:
While we have reservations about the extension
of TRIPS standards to all developing countries,
we recognise that it is most unlikely that any
WTOmembers would be keen to renegotiate the
agreement. Many members fear that in seeking
particular amendments they would be obliged to
compromise elsewhere in ways that may not
bring a net benefit to them (CIPR 2002: 160).
This pessimism is borne out by the history,
described by Claire Melamed in this volume, of
developing and least developed country attempts
to take action under the Uruguay Round provisions
that permit them to request further extensions. The
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industrialised countries have shown a considerable
unwillingness to agree generalised extensions.
2 What is special and differential
treatment?
The question posed in the heading may seem an
odd one: SDT has been a recognised concept since
the early days of the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and is the
focus of one of the Doha working groups. But it is
a relevant one because the provisions
conventionally clustered under the acronym do not
represent the full range of possibilities. On the one
hand, “special and differential treatment”, in its
literal sense, has had much broader application
than via the measures conventionally described as
“SDT”. On the other hand, there are methods for
protecting development interests in future
negotiations that do not involve formal SDT. In
other words, “SDT” is only a part of the picture.
2.1 The effects of binding dispute
settlement
Scope for special differentiation applied widely in
the GATT and benefited a very wide range of
members. This “informal” SDT was achieved by
incorporating into the GATT texts vague phrases
that could be interpreted in different ways by
different members. Such vagueness included such
current causes célèbres as the Article XXIV
requirements that a free trade agreement/customs
union should cover ‘substantially all trade’ and be
completed ‘within a reasonable period of time’.
This allowed countries with different views of what
should be done to sign up to the same set of words,
secure in the knowledge that they could apply
them in their chosen way “once the ink was dry”.
The innovation of the Uruguay Round to make
dispute settlement binding removed this escape
route. This fact was not necessarily fully recognised
by all (or even most) parties to the Uruguay Round.
The subsequent striking down by the WTO of the
United States (US) offshore tax regime and the
European Union (EU) banana regime, for example,
has concentrated minds. In neither case was the
defendant wilfully flouting WTO rules: both
believed that, on their interpretation of the rules,
they had a strong defence.
There are three reasons why this sea change from the
GATT to the WTO needs to be borne constantly in
mind. The first is that proponents of SDT are not
necessarily pressing for loopholes to be inserted into
a well-established system based upon uniform
treatment. On the contrary: the GATT provided a
highly permissive framework. The exemptions for
temperate agriculture and the Multifibre
Arrangement’s quantitative restrictions on developing
country textile and clothing exports represented only
the most visible signs that “non-discrimination”
remained a goal and not an achievement.
To the extent that multilateral trade rules have
provided an effective “one size fits all” regime, it is
only since 1994 and, as Constantine Michalopoulos
(this volume) explains in relation to agriculture,
substantial exceptions still exist. Hence, the
proponents of SDT are arguing merely for the reality,
rather than the rhetoric, of theWTO to apply, and to
recognise that binding dispute settlement requires
that this be done ex ante rather than ex post.
The second implication of change is that binding
dispute settlement has altered the character of the
WTO and its image. The WTO appears to be a
more litigious forum than was the GATT. All sorts
of policies that had been in existence for years have
been placed in the WTO’s dispute settlement
spotlight. And the proportion of cases brought by
industrial against developing countries has
increased: a review of cases brought between 1995
and 2000 found a three-fold increase compared
with the GATT period in the proportion of cases
that were brought by industrialised countries
against developing countries (Delich 2002: 76).
A corollary is the vastly more controversial image
of the WTO compared with the GATT. Rollo and
Winters argue that:
environmental and social groups wish to ensure
that WTO law does not block their preferred
domestic policies ... [and] these groups also
wish to co-opt the WTO dispute settlement
procedure, with its apparently powerful
sanctions, to enforce their preferred policies
elsewhere (Rollo and Winters 2000: 567).
Taken together, these two effects of what Rollo and
Winters call ‘The WTO’s apparently uniquely
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effective enforcement mechanism’ (Rollo and
Winters 2000: 569) have altered the character of
the Doha Round compared with the Uruguay
Round and its predecessors. Arguably this has
reduced the usefulness of the WTO as a forum
within which to discuss the relative desirability of
alternative strategies for development (or
industrialised country prosperity).
Always the participants’ eyes must be on the rules
that emerge and how to avoid unintended effects.
Domestic law on racial or gender discrimination
cannot force citizens to become tolerant, but only
prevent overt acts that cause measurable harm to
others. Therefore, it could be argued, the WTO is
not a forum in which to debate the relative
developmental merits of, e.g. India’s policies on
agricultural subsidies, but only to prevent these
policies causing damage to other countries.
The third consideration is that if binding dispute
settlement is part of the problem, its absence could
be part of the solution. The WTO texts already
contain many provisions that are not subject to
dispute settlement. As explained below, and in the
articles by Claire Melamed and Constantine
Michalopoulos (in this volume), many of these
relate to SDT, and their lack of enforceability has
contributed to developing country bitterness with
the WTO.
There is no reason of principle why contentious
issues, if they are to be covered by the WTO,
should not be defused by making the provisions
non-actionable. In other words, a WTO member
that believed another member to be failing to
honour the provision would not have the right to
take the case to the WTO’s dispute settlement
procedures and, ultimately, impose trade sanctions
to enforce the verdict.
Rollo and Winters (2000) have proposed just such
an approach in relation to environmental and
labour standards. Their “first best” outcome would
be for these issues not to be brought within the
WTO’s purview. But, failing that, they argue:
The GATT’s traditional enforcement
mechanism of allowing individual members to
act against imports from another member held
to be in violation of some norm is too intrusive
and subject to abuse to be trusted in cases
where such deep issues of sovereignty and taste
are at stake (Rollo and Winters 2000: 562).
2.2 Alternatives to “special and
differential treatment”
Formal “SDT” in the sense currently used in the
WTO does not provide the only avenue for avoiding
developmentally undesirable outcomes from
multilateral rules. The term is used principally to
describe flexibilities built in to the rules that answer
to the perceived needs of particular countries. One
alternative approach is, as indicated, to remove a
rule from the scope of dispute settlement. This
would allow a single, standard provision to be
interpreted in multiple ways.
Another option is to adopt what is called a
“positive-list approach”. A third is to return to the
concept of limited membership, or plurilateral,
agreements that proliferated under the Tokyo
Round Agreement and still exist (e.g. in the
Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA)
analysed by Giovanna Fenster (this volume). In
some cases these options may prove to be the only
feasible way forward, but they have disadvantages
compared with “SDT”, which should be noted.
The normal GATT/WTO approach to negotiations
has been to seek rules that apply to all except where
specific exceptions and caveats have been agreed.
The approach to the negotiation of large parts of the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
was completely the reverse: each country was
allowed to specify precisely the areas and types of
rule it was willing to accept, and is not committed
to anything not so specified (subject to a general
framework of concepts and principles negotiated in
the conventional fashion). This positive-list
approach would allow developing countries in
principle to deal with the problem that they cannot
assess all possible ramifications of all the negotiating
proposals. The positive-list approach would allow
them to accept only those commitments the
implications of which they had been able to assess.
There are at least three disadvantages of the
approach that could be dealt with by SDT, in the
technical sense that one could devise differential
rules that would address the problems. Whether or
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not this is politically feasible is another matter; the
only point being made here is that if SDT does deal
with the problems, then it would be a superior
solution to the positive-list approach.
One problem is that some of the less well-resourced
developing and least developed countries may not
even be aware of the extent of their lack of
knowledge. The CIPR finding that a high
proportion of the countries they studied had failed
to take account of TRIPs flexibility illustrates the
problem, as does the apparent failure of sources of
technical assistance to incorporate such flexibilities
in the legislative models they supplied. With an
SDT approach incorporating differentiation into the
rules, the weaker countries are able to rely upon the
stronger developing countries to advance their
cause (at least to the extent that their interests
overlap). This clearly does not “solve” the problem:
the TRIPs failings apply to a “traditional SDT” not a
positive-list approach, but the dangers are more
limited. It would be possible, for example, for some
of the countries identified by the CIPR subsequently
to amend their legislation to take advantage of the
flexibilities that, thanks to other WTO members,
exist within the TRIPs agreement.
A second problem is that it is wholly negative: it
relieves some members of making some
commitments; it does nothing to require other
members to assist. A complaint about much
current SDT is that it provides too little positive
support. But at least SDT could be framed in such a
way as to provide incentives for industrialised
countries to provide positive support (as is
explained in the final article in this Bulletin). And
the existence of general rules that apply with full
vigour to industrialised countries provides some
constraint on their negative actions.
Third, the extension of the positive-list approach
would sap the overall vitality of the multilateral
regulatory framework. To the extent that they are
sensible, treat equals equally and unequals
unequally, common rules are “a good thing”. They
are transparent and provide certainty. As Giovanna
Fenster shows with respect to the GPA (this
volume), a substantial amount of homework must
be done when a positive list has been applied to
determine whether or not its provisions apply to
any given contract.
The GPA is an example of a plurilateral agreement,
which provides another route to deal with
developing country concerns. If some developing
and least developed countries are unwilling to agree
rules in a certain area, why not allow those members
that are willing to press ahead? A plurilateral
agreement is one in which only those members that
have signed up have an obligation to incorporate the
agreed rules in their own legislation or the right to
benefit from the rules applied by other members.
The main disadvantage of the plurilateral as
opposed to the SDT approach is that those
countries not willing to join have no standing in
the negotiation of the rules. As both Peter Holmes
and Giovanna Fenster (this volume) make clear in
relation to competition and government
procurement respectively, much of the interest in
the potential first rounds of negotiations lies in the
precedents that they may set for future, more
powerful rules. If the foundations for future new
rules are laid only by industrialised countries, the
prospects that they will support a structure that is
pro-developmental are less good than if they are
negotiated from the outset by all interests.
3 The status quo on special and
differential treatment
Even though “SDT” is not the whole story, it is at
the centre of current discussion; and of this
Bulletin. Its history has been well covered (for
example, by Michalopoulos 2001; Whalley 1999;
Fukasaku 2000). In essence, it is that:
n SDT had its origins in a view of trade and
development that questioned the desirability of
developing countries liberalising border
measures at the same pace as industrialised
countries.
n The popularity of this approach was (possibly
temporarily) in decline in many developing
country governments during the negotiation
period for the Uruguay Round Agreement.
n Consequently, many SDT provisions on border
measures and subsidies envisage developing
countries (other than the least developed)
following a similar path to that of the
industrialised countries but at a slower pace.
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n Other SDT provisions (particularly those
covering positive support to developing
countries via financial and technical assistance
or technology transfer) were not agreed in a
form that is enforceable within the WTO
system.
The presumption of many was that the Uruguay
Round represented the beginning of the end for
SDT. Increasingly WTOmembers would accept the
same obligations. But, as suggested above, this
presumption appears now to have been misplaced.
What is clear, though, is that the SDT incorporated
into the Uruguay Round texts is unsatisfactory for
many members and observers.
3.1 Types of special and differential
treatment
There are currently three areas of SDT, and they
apply to three principal groups of countries. The
types of treatment are modulation of commitments,
trade preferences and declarations of support,
while the main country groups are the
industrialised countries, the developing countries
and the least developed.
Modulation of commitments
The most substantial SDT provisions are those
which allow for a modulation of commitments by
different type of member. Hence, for example, the
Agreement on Agriculture requires the
industrialised countries to reduce their tariffs by 36
per cent over 6 years, but developing countries
have to do so by only 24 per cent over 10 years and
least developed countries do not need to cut their
tariffs at all. As noted above, TRIPs provides
similarly extended timetables.
This aspect of SDT is normally “legally
enforceable” in the following sense. A WTO
member may use the dispensations granted under
SDT in its defence if its trade policies are
challenged by another WTO member on the
grounds that they do not conform with the
Uruguay Round commitments. Hence, for
example, if India were challenged on the grounds
that it had not reduced its agricultural tariffs by 36
per cent, it would have a watertight defence in
dispute settlement by pointing to the fact that it is
required to liberalise by only 24 per cent.
Trade preferences
The second area is the provision of trade preferences
(mainly by industrialised countries to developing
and least developed countries). Under the 1979
Enabling Clause, WTO members are permitted to
suspend the granting of most-favoured-nation
(MFN) treatment in cases where they are offering
better-than-MFN tariffs to developing countries.
The legal enforceability of these provisions is
questionable. A strong case can be made that the
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) of most
industrialised countries can be justified under the
SDT provisions of the Enabling Clause. In other
words, if the EU were to be challenged in dispute
settlement by, say, the United States of America
(USA) on the grounds that the standard GSP tariff
available to all developing countries was lower than
the MFN tariff being applied to imports from the
USA, the EU would probably be able to cite the SDT
provisions of the Enabling Clause in its defence.
However, as has been seen in the case of the
challenges from Latin America and the USA to the
EU banana regime, other aspects of trade preferences
are less securely underpinned by legally enforceable
SDT. Problems arose in the case of bananas because:
n the differential tariff was challenged on the
grounds that it favoured one group of developing
countries over another (and, hence, could not be
justified under the Enabling Clause);
n the system of import licensing for companies
was challenged on the grounds that it
contravened the EU’s commitments under the
General Agreement on Tariffs (GATS).
Ancillary support
The third area of SDT is wholly unenforceable. It
comprises the large number of declarations of
support for developing countries that litter the
Uruguay Round texts. For example, Article 4 of
GATS deals with encouraging the increased
participation of developing countries in
international services trade through ‘negotiated
specific commitments’ relating to the strengthening
of their domestic services capacity, improvement of
their access to distribution channels and
liberalisation of market access in sectors and modes
of supply of export interest to them. Similarly, the
Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative
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Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed
and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries requires
members to review the level of food aid to ensure
that it is sufficient to meet the legitimate needs of
developing countries, to adopt guidelines to ensure
that an increasing proportion is provided to least
developed countries and net food-importing
developing countries (NFIDCs) and to give full
consideration in their aid programmes to help
improve agricultural productivity and infrastructure.
There are many other such references.
As is well known, there is no action that an
aggrieved developing country can take either inside
or outside the WTO to force another member (or
an international organisation) to take actions that it
believes are consistent with these undertakings. A
considerable element of the discontent expressed
by developing countries in the WTO about the
failures of SDT derives from resentment that they
were “hoodwinked” into signing the Single
Undertaking through promises that were, literally,
not worth the paper they were written on.
Lessons
What lessons are to be drawn from this review of
the status quo? There are at least three:
1. SDT provisions are worthwhile only if they are
enforceable in some fashion that is relevant to
the situation to which they respond.
2. This lesson has not been lost upon developing
countries, and so the tactic used during the
final stages of the Uruguay Round to bring
everyone on board (of offering unenforceable
ancillary support) will probably not work at
the end of the Doha Round.
3. The WTO has no internal mechanism to
adjudicate on membership of state groups to
which legally enforceable SDT applies. The
least developed country group is a United
Nations (UN) category that WTO members
have chosen to accept as a basis for special
treatment and, while NFIDC membership
requires a state to fulfil certain criteria, these
are minimal.1 All other categories are self-
selecting: each member indicates whether it
considers itself to be an industrialised or a
developing country (or NFIDC).
3.2 Problems with the status quo
There are two principal problems with the status
quo. One is that the existing, legally enforceable
provisions are eroding assets. The other is that large
areas of “new” trade policy are without any legally
enforceable SDT.
Most legally enforceable SDT is an eroding asset in
the sense that it provides modulation of
commitments, the vitality of which will decline
directly (if time limited) and indirectly (if it relates
to removal of barriers that all members are
reducing over time). Hence, the implementation
delays under TRIPs and the Agreement on
Agriculture cease to provide differential treatment
once the extended timetable has expired. Similarly,
SDT provisions that require developing countries
to liberalise/reduce subsidies, etc., but to a lesser
extent than industrialised countries, will in due
course cease to have validity when the developing
countries’ remaining barriers reach very low levels.
It is true that in cases where least developed
countries have been exempted from tariff/subsidy
reduction altogether their concessions will not be
eroded in this way. But many vulnerable
developing countries do not fall within the least
developed group.
The problem in the new areas of trade policy (such
as TRIPs, services, government procurement and
competition policy) is that it is far from clear what
form effective SDT would take. Evidently, the
removal of formal market access barriers is either
irrelevant or a minor aspect of rule formation.
Hence, the “traditional recipe” of slower, more
limited barrier removal is not relevant. At the same
time, even in cases where the form of SDT has been
identified the modalities remain an area of
controversy, as noted above under TRIPs.
3.3 The analytical case for special and
differential treatment
What are the analytical criteria for SDT? The
fundamental criterion is that, in the area being
negotiated, there should be a recognition that a “one
size fits all” approach is not necessarily appropriate.
Almost all WTO members adopt this principle to a
greater or lesser extent in their domestic economic
policy. Many countries have differential economic
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policies to favour peripheral regions or
disadvantaged social groups. This is in recognition
of the political, if not the economic, necessity to treat
some areas/groups differently from others. Such
considerations apply a fortiori at the global level.
Hence, the default assumption at the multilateral
level should be that one size does not fit all.
Economic, administrative and political criteria
If the default assumption is that this fundamental
criterion is normally present, then three further
criteria are required to support a case for SDT. They
are:
1. The interests of each member must not be so
different that they require unique treatment.
2. There must be some way to identify broad
groups of countries that share sufficiently
similar characteristics to warrant the
uniformity of treatment among themselves, but
differential treatment compared with others.
3. There must be some actionable mechanisms
that relate to these shared differences and to the
rules that are being proposed.
Balancing similarity and difference
In a sense, every country is different, and each one
makes its own, independent commitments during
WTO Rounds. These commitments are reflected in
its national schedules, which apply any general
principles that have been agreed to its national
trade-related policies. For issues where every
country is completely unique, the only way in which
difference can be reflected is through variations in
agreed commitments in the national schedules.
Achieving differentiation through national schedules
however, presents either an infeasibly large
negotiating burden or substantial post-agreement
risks. For every WTO member to reach agreement
with every other one on the precise provisions of its
national schedules could not realistically be
accomplished within the timespan of a normal set of
WTO negotiations. The Uruguay Round tariff
schedules of the EU alone run to some 9,500 lines.
Hence, there would be an element (probably a large
one) in which states took on trust that each
member’s national implementation schedules
faithfully reflected the general rules agreed, applying
them in a way that was sensitive to the domestic
situation. But, without any agreed modulation
established in the general principles, such action
would be highly vulnerable to subsequent dispute
settlement in which one party argued that another’s
implementation schedules did not fully reflect the
general principles that had been agreed.
Identifying groups
While recognising, therefore, that every country is
different, it is highly desirable to identify broad
groups with similar characteristics that can be
reflected in modulations to the general principles
incorporated in the Doha Round texts. But how are
such characteristics to be measured? Work by the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) has shown the shortcomings
of most “off-the-peg” indices, and has contributed
to the task of assessing new combinations of
criteria (OECD 2001). From this it is clear that
much work remains to be done.
Constantine Michalopoulos (this volume) reviews
the arguments for special provisions in the new
Agreement on Agriculture for food insecure states.
But how is food insecurity to be identified, and
what organisation is to judge whether or not a
country is, or is not, food insecure? Should
exemptions apply to the whole of a state’s
agricultural sector, to poor farmers, or to all poor
people regardless of their occupation?
Unless such practical issues can be overcome, the
scope for highly nuanced SDT is limited. But such
differentiation will affect developing and least
developed countries in different ways. The article
on food security classifications provides an
illustration. Most countries’ initial positions will be
that they want a definition of food security SDT
that suits their particular circumstances, leading to
general phrases or long lists of actionable features.
Yet the more imprecisely defined or all-embracing
the characteristics of entitlement, the more bland
the agreed SDT is likely to be. For example, it is
possible that WTO members would agree to very
substantial SDT within the Agreement on
Agriculture in relation to market access and
domestic subsidies if it applied only to very poor
states with sickly agricultural sectors. But it is
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implausible to expect them to do so if it were
available to all developing countries, since it would
then apply equally to Cairns Group members.
This point is discussed by Claire Melamed (in this
volume). She argues that developing countries are
aware that the “price” of significant SDT will be
greater differentiation, but they see no purpose in
tackling such a thorny political issue in the absence
of any evidence that the industrialised countries are
willing to offer “significant SDT”. This is a log jam
that will have to be broken if the Doha Round is to
proceed. Until it is, the role of research is to
establish an understanding of relevant criteria,
appropriate remedies, and the country
membership of alternative groupings.
Modulations
Finally, having identified groups with common
features it is also necessary to identify specific,
actionable modulations in the rules that answer to
these characteristics. Without this link, SDT will
tend to be exhortatory rather than legally
enforceable.
To continue with the Agreement on Agriculture
example, in what sense should most food insecure
states be treated differently in relation to market
access liberalisation or the provisions on domestic
subsidies than other states? Answers to such
questions spring easily to mind in relation to the
Agreement on Agriculture because the agenda is
familiar (tariff cuts, subsidy reductions, etc.).
But what if the same question were asked of
proposed new rules on competition policy? There
are at least two sets of problems. In cases where the
proposed new rules require governments to do
something positive which is within their power, the
issues are the ones familiar from old SDT: are the
proposed changes more burdensome for poorer
countries (as supporters of SDT have tended to
argue in the past) or more necessary (as their
opponents have claimed)? Just as battle lines were
drawn in the past between opponents of sharp
liberalisation by developing countries and those
arguing that the poorer the state the more it stood
to gain, so there will probably be dispute over
whether or not poor countries stand to gain more
rather than less than rich ones from transparent
government procurement open to all suppliers.
The second set of problems arises in cases where
governments are required to do something positive
that is not within their power. Some of the criticisms
of TRIPs (IDS–DFID 1999) and of the Customs
Valuation Code (Finger and Schuler 2000) argue that
the actual and opportunity costs of compliance are
too high. Here the argument may be over the relative
merits of modulating commitments as opposed to
providing support to facilitate compliance. The issues
are taken up again in the final article of the Bulletin.
The contribution of the Bulletin
The extent to which a contribution can be made to
the resolution of these questions depends upon the
progress that has been made in defining the issues.
Where WTO rules already exist, it is feasible in
principle to identify precisely what needs to be
done. In practice, as Claire Melamed shows (this
volume), the discussions in the CTD have often
lacked precision. But she argues that the major
problem is less the limited availability of compelling
evidence on the changes that need to be made than
an unwillingness by industrialised countries to
reopen existing texts except in the context of
negotiations on new rules.
In cases like competition policy and government
procurement, the issue is not to design precise
modulation, which is impossible until there exists
more clarity on what multilateral rules might be
seriously discussed. Giovanna Fenster (this
volume) shows, in relation to government
procurement, that mutually contradictory messages
are emanating from different parts of the Geneva-
based system. Peter Holmes (this volume) explains
how there exist two very different concepts of what
an international competition policy might achieve.
While these are not mutually incompatible,
opinion has tended to polarise with some active
industrialised countries focusing on one, and active
developing countries on the other.
For the present, therefore, the task of research is to
clarify the issues, to show the ways in which
multilateral policies might impact on development,
and to provide initial indications of the potentially
positive and negative features of any regime. If
negotiations progress, this sensitisation research
will allow an initial assessment to be made of the
potential development effects of any proposals that
eventually emerge, and will provide the
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foundations for the more precise research that will
then be possible.
Agriculture falls between these two extremes. A
text exists, but it is largely non-constraining. The
outcomes of the current negotiations cannot be
known, but there are some good pointers to the
range of rule changes that might be agreed.
Constantine Michalopoulos (this volume) assesses
the development implications of the current regime
and analyses the merits of alternative means to deal
with some of the more widely expected changes.
And following that, Christopher Stevens and Jane
Kennan provide an introduction to the task of
classifying countries once the extent of any change
becomes more clear.
Where do we go from here? The initial GATT dealt
with a relatively simple agenda and was highly
successful. The WTO built on this success and on
the enormous increase in the complexity of global
commerce, to extend its portfolio into more tricky
areas. For a simple agenda, simple differentiation
may suffice. More complex agendas require a
similar evolution in the approach to differentiation.
Much remains unknown about the nature of the
new rules that will be discussed seriously. The
precise implications of those rules cannot be
assessed until their form has become clearer. Such
an assessment may well take time to complete. In
the meantime, a better consensus on an approach
to the problem is required. The final article in this
Bulletin sets out an analytical framework within
which new rules should be examined to identify
the extent and type of SDT that could be justified.
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Notes
1. To be a member of the NFIDC, group a state must:
n be a developing country;
n have been a net importer of basic foodstuffs in any 3
years of the most recent 5-year period for which data
are available;
Michalopoulos, C., 2001, Developing Countries in the
WTO, New York and Basingstoke: PalgraveMacmillan
OECD, 2001, ‘Analytical criteria for calibrating
provisions for special and differential treatment
across different beneficiaries’, TD/TC.WP(2001)27,
Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development Trade Directorate, Trade Committee
PIU, 2000, ‘Rights of exchange: social, health,
environmental and trade objectives on the global
stage’, Performance and Innovation Unit Report,
September, London: Cabinet Office
Rollo, J. and Winters, L.A., 2000, ‘Subsidiarity and
governance challenges for theWTO: environmental
and labour standards’, The World Economy, Vol 23
No 4: 561–77
Whalley, J., 1999, ‘Special and differential treatment
in the millennium round’, Working Paper 30/99,
Coventry: University of Warwick, Centre for the
Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation
WTO, 2001, ‘Ministerial Declaration’, WT/MIN(01)/
DEC/1, 20 November, Geneva: World Trade
Organization
n notify the WTO Committee on Agriculture of its
wish to be so classified.
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